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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983): 
(a) Properly bars plaintiff's claim for failing to 
bring such claim within the time prescribed by the Act, 
(b) Properly conforms to the open courts and equal 
protection provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
Sections 11 and 24, under the facts of this case; and 
(c) Properly conforms to the due process clause of 
the Utah Constitution and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action brought on behalf of a 
six year old child to recover damages for injuries he allegedly 
sustained as the result of negligent diagnosis and treatment. 
(Record at 5.) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted respondent's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings for the reason that appellants' claims are barred 
by the statute of limitations set forth by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann., § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983). 
(Record at 71-72.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nathan Lee Garza was born on August 16, 1979. Nearly one 
year later on August 1, 1980, Suzanne Lee, Nathan's mother had 
Nathan examined by Dr. Lindsey of Provo, Utah, who referred the 
patient to Dr. Lynn Gaufin, a neurosurgeon. (Record at 29.) 
Defendant, Dr. Gaufin examined plaintiff, Nathan Lee Garza, on 
August 13, 1980, August 29, 1980, and October 24, 1980, and has 
provided no treatment to plaintiffs since that time. (Record 
at 13.) 
Nathan's mother, Suzanne Lee is a responsible parent, who 
after becoming aware of the severity of her son's condition, 
not only sought medical treatment for him, but also sought to 
pursue any legal remedy available to him by retaining Provo 
attorney, Dean Zabriskie to represent Nathan. (Record at 30.) 
Dean Zabriskie filed a Notice of Claim on behalf of Nathan 
Garza on May 6, 1983 (R. 12, 30.) Although this filing may 
have been timely, Mrs. Lee instructed Mr. Zabriskie to drop the 
case completely. (Record at 30.) 
Despite the fact that Mrs. Lee was aware of her son's con-
dition and had already instructed one attorney to drop the 
case, Mrs. Lee commenced this action by filing a complaint on 
March 8, 1985, more than four years after the rendering of 
health care of which plaintiffs complain. (Record at 19.) 
Defendant, Dr. Gaufin moved for judgment on the pleadings 
in the lower court on the ground that the Utah Health Care 
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Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann., § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983) bars 
plaintiffs' claim. (Record at 16.) The lower court, the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding, after a full and 
fair hearing, granted defendant's motion and entered judgment 
accordingly. (Record at 71-72.) This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In 1976, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act to protect the public from adverse effects of 
the rising incidence and cost of medical malpractice claims. 
This Court on several prior occasions has upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Act, including its statute of limitations 
which applies equally to all persons. 
The Legislature's prerogative to determine whether a 
statute of limitations applies or is tolled with respect to 
minors claims is well settled. Minors have no constitutional 
rights beyond others and are not inherently entitled to exemp-
tion from the operation of a statute of limitations. The 
legislative intent to meet the public needs is unequivocally 
clear: it is in the public's interest that minors claims 
against health care providers be timely filed. Legislative 
intent distinguishes this circumstance from the court decisions 
in other cases upon which appellant relies, demonstrating that 
the Act conforms with the requirements of the Utah "open 
-3-
courts" and equal protection provisions by allowing timely 
minors* claims to be brought. 
In harmony with federal and foreign state decisions, this 
Court has consistently applied a rational basis test to deter-
mine that the act constitutionally assures guarantees equal 
protection and access to the courts. This Court determined 
that the Legislature may properly treat health care providers 
as a separate class, and it is evident that equal treatment of 
minors and adults concerning operation of the statute of limi-
tations reasonably furthers the Legislature's objectives. 
Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is constitutional. 
The claims asserted in this lawsuit commenced more than 
four years after the physician last saw the patient and are 
properly barre_ as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS FOR DEFENDANT BECAUSE PLAIN-
TIFFS* CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS CONSTITUTION-
ALLY VALID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Under Utah law, a medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider must be commenced within two years of the 
date when the patient or plaintiff discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he has 
suffered a legal injury, but not to exceed four years from the 
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alleged negligent act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983); 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). This statute of 
limitations is part of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
L. 1976 ch. 23 (the "Act"), and applies equally to "all 
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (Supp. 1983). 
The lower court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor 
of the defendant on the ground that the minor plaintiff's 
claim, filed over four years after it arose is barred by the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983). By enter-
ing its judgment on the pleadings, the lower court rejected the 
same constitutional attacks which plaintiff reasserts on appeal, 
A. Utah Case Law Supports the Constitutionality Of 
Section 78-14-4 Of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
Utah courts have strongly and consistently upheld the con-
stitutionality of the provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act "to protect and insure the continued availabil-
ity of health care services to the public . . . ." Allen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 
1981). See also Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 
352 (Utah 1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); and Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 
(Utah 1978) . 
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Likewise, federal courts reviewing the constitutionality of 
Section 78-14-4 of the Act uniformly sustain its validity for 
the reason that the medical malpractice statutes do not violate 
constitutional due process rights of injured infants or their 
parents. Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (D. Utah 
1984) . 
This Court's decision in Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., is representative of the support this Court gives 
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical 
malpractice. In Allen this Court unanimously rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations 
for medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection. Indeed, this Court held that: 
(1) the Utah Legislature's exercise of discretionary preroga-
tive would ensure continued availability of health care ser-
vices and (2) such action does not exceed constitutional prohi-
bitions. Allen, 635 P.2d at 32. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Allen is constitutional to the 
extent that the legislature may reasonably limit the time for 
filing adult's medical malpractice claims, but argue that the 
legislature may not limit minor's claims because the limitation 
as applied to minors allegedly violates the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Sections 11 and 24. 
However, plaintiffs' argument fails to consider the funda-
mental principle that the legislature may place minors on equal 
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footing with adults without affecting constitutional rights. 
The United States Supreme Court declared in Vance v. Vance, 108 
U.S. 514 (1883): 
The Constitution of the United States . . . gives 
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it is 
within the legislative competency of the State . . . 
to make exceptions in their favor or not. (emphasis 
added.) 
In harmony with the Supreme Court's declaration, the court 
in Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 1980) 
stated that the legislature is not under any constitutional 
mandate to suspend operation of statutes of limitation in cases 
of infancy or incapacity. Likewise, the general rule of law as 
stated in 51 Am. Jur. 2d 750, Limitation of Actions § 182 
(1970) points out that minority does not per se bestow immunity 
upon an infant or his guardian without a legislative saving in 
his favor, and a statute of limitations will ordinarily run 
against the claims of infants in the absence of a contrary 
statute. 
Plaintiff's attempt to single out minors as a separate 
class from the protected or affected groups is inappropriate. 
As discussed above, minors do not have any constitutional right 
to different treatment before the law than their adult counter-
parts. See, e.g. 54 C.J.S. 262, Limitations of Actions § 235. 
"Exemptions ordinarily granted to infants do not rest on any 
fundamental doctrine of the law, but on the legislative will 
expressed in the statutes; infants may be put on the same 
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footing as adults in this respect, and unless excepted they so 
stand . . . . M Id. 
In this case it is absolutely clear that the intent of the 
1976 Utah Legislature was to place adults and minors on equal 
footing with respect to the operation of the Statue of Limita-
tions for medical malpractice claims. The provision was even 
amended by the 1979 legislature to ensure that no one could 
mistake the legislature's intent following the Court's decision 
in Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, discussed 
infra at Point 1(D). The legislature's decision to place 
minors on the same footing as adults is within its prerogative 
and is not a constitutional infringement of minors' rights. 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah 
recently reaffirmed the Vance "equal footing" principle in 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984). In that 
decision the federal court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant health care providers, holding that the minor 
plaintiff's claim was barred by the medical malpractice statute 
of limitations. The court's opinion recognizes as "universally 
accepted" the rule that a "legislature may put adults and 
infants on the same footing with respect to statutes of limita-
tion without affecting constitutional rights." Hargett, 598 
F. Supp. at 156. Thus, the Hargett court rejected the same 
constitutional attack raised on this appeal. 
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Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion con-
cerning the operation of statutes of limitation against minors* 
claims. In Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th 
Cir. 1980) the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
M[I]t is well established that a claimant's minority does not 
toll the running of the statute of limitations under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act." In Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 
578, 579 (9th Cir. 1965), the court stated that minority does 
not toll the statute of limitations, and the parents or guar-
dians of a minor must preserve his claim by timely action. 
Finally, in Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965), the Supreme Court 
found that equal protection guarantees are not violated by 
applying shortened statute of limitations to a minor's claim. 
In summary, state and federal case precedents demonstrate 
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limita-
tions, which places adults and minors on equal footing, is a 
constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a 
rational response to the stated legislative purpose of insuring 
the continued availability of medical care, while addressing 
the medical malpractice insurance crisis and its attendant 
effect upon the quality of health care in Utah. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-2 (1977). 
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B. Section 78-14-4 does not bar minors' claims. 
Plaintiffs suggest that § 78-14-4 "abrogates the common law 
right a minor has to recover for personal injuries" under the 
Utah Constitution. However, minors (3o have access to the 
courts as demonstrated by current statistics which are estab-
lished by appellant's own cited authorities: (1) One-seventh 
(1/7) of all medical malpractice claims involve minors; 
Jenkens, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, 
An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 960-61 
(1979); and (2) courts recognize that most claims of minors 
will be brought quickly. Barrio v. San Manuel Division 
Hospital for Magma Copper Co., 692 P.2d 280, 286 (Ariz. 1984). 
In Utah, assuming that one-seventh of the 30 malpractice 
claims being filed each month are brought by minors, 51 
malpractice claims are being brought by minors within the 
statutory period each year. In contrast, only three tardy 
claims, stating constitutional challenges against Section 
78-14-4 have surfaced in the ten year period since Section 
78-14-4 was enacted in 1976. Dee Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. 
Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984); Blum v. Stone, Case No. 20288 (cur-
rently pending before the Utah Supreme Court); and the instant 
case. 
Furthermore, it is evident that minors' medical malpractice 
claims are being both heard and vindicated in Utah courts with 
increasingly greater damage recoveries being awarded. 
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Recently, a Utah jury awarded $4,775,000 to the mother of a 
child who was born a spastic quadriplegic because of an attend-
ing physician's misuse of a labor inducing drug. Jury Verdict 
Research Inc. Personal Injury Verdict Survey, Utah Edition 7 
(1983). In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1984), this court affirmed a $1.5 million jury verdict in 
a products liability action brought by the parents of Elizabeth 
Ann Barson, who suffered serious birth defects resulting from 
negligent prenatal administration of a progestational drug. 
These and other cases, coupled with the number of timely 
claims made by Utah minors demonstrate that the Utah courts' 
doors1 are open to all medical malpractice claims whether 
brought by adults or on behalf of minors. Section 78-14-4 does 
not violate the Article I, Section 11 open courts provision. 
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 156. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' argument that the protection of 
the tolling statute is needed for minors whose parents or 
guardians are ignorant or unmotivated has no application in 
Article I, Section 11 provides: "All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or unneces-
sary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself 
or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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this case. Indeed, plaintiffs approached an attorney concern-
ing the matter within the statutory period, but later elected 
to drop the matter completely, (Record at 12, 30.) There is 
simply no justification to now permit the action to be brought 
after the statutory period has elapsed. The possibility that 
some minors may not have effective or alert guardians does not 
raise an issue of constitutional significance. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that "our constitu-
tional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is "the 
mere creature of the state and . . . historically [the law] has 
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act 
in the best interest of their children. Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584, 602 (1979); and "parents naturally take an interest 
in the welfare of their children--an interest that is particu-
larly strong where a normal family relationship exists and 
where the child is living with one or both parents." Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979). 
Section 78-14-4 should not fail simply because its opera-
tion is not in all counts perfect; the legislature is entitled 
to proceed in accordance with its appraisal of the greatest 
good for the greatest number. Thus, it is this court's duty to 
uphold Section 78-14-4 as against constitutional challenge, 
unless unconstitutionality is firmly demonstrated. 
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C. Section 78-14-4 Is Constitutional Because It Reason-
ably Protects 
Preserving 
Against Social 
The Continued Ava] 
And Economic 
Liability of 
Evils 
Health 
While 
Care 
In Utah. 
The thrust of plaintiffs' argument on appeal is that this 
Court should wield Article I Section 11 powers under the Utah 
Constitution to restrict the legislature's power, to apply 
Section 78-14-4 to minors unless there is a "[1] clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated and [2] the elimination of a 
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
the objective." Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 25 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30, 36 (Case No. 17694) (December 31, 1985) and appel-
lant's brief at 5. Plaintiff also contends that there is no 
medical malpractice insurance crisis to serve as a legislative 
justification for enacting Section 78-x4-4 and, thus, there is 
no evil to be eliminated or reasonable objective underlying the 
Act. 
Plaintiffs' arguments, however, are misplaced because 
Section 78-14-4 is necessary to: (1) eliminate both social and 
economic evils, and (2) provide adequate and reasonable means 
of insuring continued availability of health care services to 
the public in Utah. 
1. Section 78-14-4 is Necessary to Eliminate Social and 
economic evils. 
a. Prompt presentations of claims is necessary. 
The legislature's justification for creating a shortened 
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statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims remains 
equally valid today as when it was enac ed. One of the pur-
poses of the Act's statute of limitations is to encourage 
prompt presentation of claims so that the alleged tort-feasor 
has a fair opportunity to defend against malpractice claims. 
In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill (1979) the Court 
stated: 
When any alleged tort feasor is required to 
defend a claim long after the alleged wrong has occur-
red, the ability to successfully do so is diminished 
by reason of dimmed memories, the death of witnesses, 
and lost documents. As the years between injury and 
suit increase, so does the probability that the search 
for truth at trial will be impeded and contorted to 
the benefit of the plaintiff. This harm can be 
exacerbated where the injured party continues to grow, 
develop and change, both physically and mentally, 
after the injury complained of has occurred. . . . 
See also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 
604 (Ind. 1980). This Court has likewise acknowledged that 
special protection is needed against the filing of tardy 
medical malpractice claims, and that the medical malpractice 
statute limitations has the salutary effect of "adequately 
shielding health care providers from claims against which it 
may be difficult to defend because of the lapse of 
time. . . .- Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1979). 
b. Non-tolling statutes make standard of care deter-
minations feasible. 
The legislature properly recognized the need to treat 
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort 
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actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limita-
tions* Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical mal-
practice case creates an insurmountable problem of trying to 
determine the applicable standard of care long after the treat-
ment and injury occur. 
Advances in knowledge and technology occur so rapidly in 
medicine that state-of-the-art treatment today is likely to be 
considered archaic in the very near future. Medicine is indeed 
a constant losing battle against obsolescence. It is unreason-
able to assume that a court or jury can determine the appli-
cable standard of care with any degree of fairness years after 
the fact. Furthermore, it would be impossible for jurors to 
fairly assess the physician's actions based upon an ancient 
standard of care without taking into account their personal 
knowledge of advances which have occurred during the lapse in 
time which make older techniques of treatment seem inappro-
priate or fraught with negligence. 
c. Absent Section 78-14-4 continued availability of 
health care in Utah is seriously threatened. 
Stale claims and standard of care determination problems 
are compounded in this case because Nathan Garza is a minor and 
mentally retarded. (Record at 30.) Even after Nathan Garza 
reaches majority he will still be unable and legally incompe-
tent to make decisions concerning his own legal rights. He 
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will remain unable to initiate legal proceedings on his own 
behalf. 
If plaintiff's argument is accepted, the statute of limita-
tions for a medical malpractice claim for Nathan Garza and 
others similarly situated may never commence to run, and an 
action on their behalf could be instituted decades after the 
cause of action allegedly arises. The potential liability of 
health care providers and the exposure to liability of profes-
sional malpractice liability insurers becomes increasingly 
unpredictable and indefinite. 
Because the insurance industry depends on predictability to 
determine premiums and maintain sufficient reserves, many 
insurers would respond to the threat of uncertainty and prob-
lems related to defending against stale claims by withdrawing 
from malpractice liability insurance markets. Note, The 
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on 
Patient's Rights, 10 Vol. Val. U. L. Rev. 303, 305 n. 10 (1976). 
Since 1976 three malpractice insurers have left the Utah 
market because of the medical malpractice crisis, including the 
withdrawal of Aetna Life & Casualty in 1984. See Note, Medical 
Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, 11 Utah J. Contemp. L. 
287, 288 n. 5 (1984). Since malpractice insurance is directly 
linked to provision of health care services, the withdrawal of 
liability insurers threatens the withdrawal of health care pro-
viders and their services. 
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It was the specter of this medical malpractice crisis which 
led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude: 
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent 
persons from the general tolling provisions (Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-36) is rationally related to the stated 
purpose of containing the malpractice insurance 
crisis. That rationality is particularly evidenced by 
the facts of the present case. Serious permanent 
injuries to children are often cases of large poten-
tial damages. If the period in which such claims 
could be brought were tolled until the young child 
reached the age of majority, a heavy burden would be 
placed on insurance carriers in evaluating and defend-
ing against the claim, establishing appropriate 
reserve requirements, and setting rates. The percen-
tage of medical malpractice claims brought by minors 
is far from insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty 
inherent in tolling the period in which such claims 
may be brought could drastically affect insurance 
rates. . . . 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. at 158. Hence, section 
78-14-4 is absolutely necessary to insure the continued availa-
bility of health care services in Utah by containing the mal-
practice insurance crisis. 
2. Section 78-14-4 is a necessary and reasonable means of 
insuring the continued availability of health care 
services to Utah citizens. 
Because the Utah legislature recognized the absolute neces-
sity of preventing the adverse effects and the rising incidence 
and cost of medical malpractice claims from eliminating provi-
sion of health care services in Utah, the legislature responded 
by enacting the Utah Health Care Medical Malpractice Act, 
including its statute of limitations. the facts substantiating 
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the crisis were and continue to be more than evident. Indeed, 
it is naive to suggest that a medical malpractice crisis does 
not exist. 
The American Medical Association recently indicated that: 
There is a crisis in professional liability, it 
will get worse if comprehensive action is not taken 
. . . . The huge continuing increases in premiums, 
suits and awards are significantly and adversely 
affecting the cost and availability of health care in 
the United States. (emphasis added.) 
Response of the AMA to the ATLA Statements Regarding the 
Professional Liability Crisis, AMA Task Force On Professional 
Liability and Insurance (August 1985). 
The medical malpractice crisis is particularly acute in 
specialized areas of medical practice, such as neurosurgery. 
These specialists are being forced to restrict their services 
and reduce their high risk caseloads which ultimately reduces 
the quality and availability of health care. AMA Responses, 
at 3. Across all specialties, three times as many claims are 
filed against physicians than were filed ten years ago. AMA, 
Socioeconomic Monitoring System (19 84); Malpractice, Balancing 
the Issues, Ambulatory Care, p. 9, (June, 1985). At least one 
in every ten doctors is sued each year. P. Danzon, The 
Frequency And Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims 1 (1982). 
The situation in Utah is even worse: an average of 30 mal-
practice claims are presented per month. Utah Dept. of 
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Business Regulation Memorandum, Pre-litigation Medical 
Malpractice Review (October, 1985 - April, 1986) 
Accordingly, seventy percent of physicians now indicate 
that they have altered their practice of medicine to protect 
against lawsuits. AMA, Center for Health Policy Research, 
April, 1985. Current estimates indicate that medical costs 
related to professional liability, including defensive medi-
cine, accounted for twenty percent to twenty-five percent of 
the $69 billion spent on physicians' services in 1983 which 
amounts to $13.8 to $17.3 billion. National Health 
Expenditures, 19 83; Health Care Financing And Review, Vol. 7, 
No. 2, Winter 1984. Increases in malpractice awards also add 
to the already startling medical malpractice crisis. See 
Argument § 1(B) supra. 
Furthermore, the extent of the current professional liabil-
ity crisis is most accurately revealed by current data, 
indicating that average expenditures for professional liability 
insurance rose by 44.8% between 1982 and 1984. American 
Medical Association, Center for Health Policy Research, 1985. 
The figure is Utah is significantly greater: Two of the major 
Utah medical professional liability insurers more than doubled 
premium rates for physicians and surgeons between 1984 and 
1985. State of Utah Insurance Department Medical Professional 
Liability Insurance Premium Revision, The St. Paul Property & 
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Liability Insurance Company Rate Increase Filings, (December 7, 
1984 and December 10, 1985) (reflecting a 109.5% increase from 
1984 to 1985); State of Utah Insurance Department Medical 
Professional Liability Insurance Premium Rate Revision, UMIA 
Rate Increase Filings (January 27, 1984 and December 26, 1985) 
(reflecting a 109% increase from 1984 to 1985). 
The extraordinary liability crisis coupled with huge pre-
mium increases for physicians, especially high risk specialists 
such as neurosurgeons is a problem for every physician and 
every patient. In addressing this issue, the Kansas Supreme 
Court concluded: 
. . . low risk practitioners need high risk 
specialists in order to provide comprehensive care for 
their patients. Were insurance coverage unavailable 
for the specialists in high risk fields, the evidence 
indicates these professional would either leave the 
state or would soon quit the practice, causing a 
general decline in the overall quality of health care 
available. . . . 
State ex rel. Schneider v. Ligget, 576 P.2d 221, 229 (Kan. 
1978) . 
The existing insurance crisis will be exacerbated and the 
practice of specialized medicine might well become an uninsur-
able risk if the statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions is tolled on such claims until an infant reaches 
majority. Therefore, § 78-14-4 is not only a reasonable means 
of achieving legislative objectives, but it is also a necessary 
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means of assuring Utah citizens of continued health care 
services. 
D. Scott v. School Board of Granite School District Does 
Not Invalidate the Medical Malpractice Statute of 
Limitations as Applied to Minors' Claims. 
Plaintiff's argument on appeal intimates that this Court 
has declared the non-tolling of a statute of limitations uncon-
stitutional, as applied to minors. Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 10-11. In Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the statutory provision at 
issue was Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1977), the notice of claim 
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-1 et: seg. (1977). Plaintiff suggests that the dictum 
contained in the Court's opinion invalidated not only 
§ 63-30-13, but also other provisions which limit the effect of 
the general tolling provision for minor's claims as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1) (1977). (Appellant's Brief 
pp. 10-11). 
However, Scott is not a case of constitutional dimension; 
it is, rather, an example of judicial interpretation of 
statutes to further the legislature's intent and objectives. 
A line of Utah cases prior to Scott held that the tolling 
provisions of § 78-12-36 did not excuse a minor's failure to 
timely file the notice of claim required by § 63-30-13 before 
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commencing an action against a political subdivision of the 
state. See e.g. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 
(1973) . 
In 1973, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-7-77, a notice of claim provision relating to certain 
claims against cities or incorporated towns which was similar 
in content and effect to § 63-30-13. The amendment provided: 
If the person for whom a claim is made is a minor, 
then the claims covered by this section may be so 
presented within the time limits specified above or 
within one year after the person reaches the age of 
majority, whichever is longer. 
In Scott the Court found that this amendment, coupled with 
the Legislature's enactment of the general tolling provision in 
§ 78-12-36(1), made it "abundantly clear" that the Legisla-
ture's general intent at that time was to protect minor's 
claims against governmental entities. Scott, 568 P.2d at 748. 
Given that legislative intent, and the similarities between the 
two notice of claim provisions, the Court was unable to find 
any reason for the 1973 Legislature's failure to similarly 
amend § 63-30-13 and the minor's claim should be preserved. 
The Court did not declare § 63-30-13 unconstitutional, but 
simply overruled a prior line of cases in deference to what the 
Court perceived to be a new expression of legislative grace in 
favor of minors. 
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The Scott decision is consistent with this Court's prior 
rulings concerning judicial review of legislative enactments. 
The Court has stated that its primary responsibility and pur-
pose in interpreting statutory enactments is to give effect to 
the underlying legislative intent. Millett v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)- The Court has also 
stated that it will avoid constitutional questions wherever 
possible: 
The right and power of the judiciary to declare 
whether legislative enactments exceed constitutional 
limitations is to be exercised with considerable 
restraint and in conformity with fundamental rules. 
One such fundamental rule of long-standing is that 
unnecessary decisions are to be avoided and that the 
court should pass upon the constitutionality of a 
statute only when such a determination is essential to 
the decision in a case. . . . 
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980). 
The Scott decision is consistent with these rules of 
judicial review. The decision interpreted and gave full effect 
to the perceived legislative intent. It did not, however, 
invalidate the notice of claim statute, nor did the Court 
review and pass upon the constitutionality of any other statu-
tory provision not before the Court. The Scott decision there-
fore has no effect beyond its own facts. 
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POINT II 
SECTION 78-14-4 IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PERMISSIBLE ENACTMENT. 
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on constitu-
tional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof. Judicial review 
of a properly enacted law begins with the strong presumption 
that the law is constitutional. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 
1220, 1222 (Utah 1983). This Court has consistently held that 
it is not the function of the judiciary to second guess the 
wisdom or propriety of legislation. 
But the wisdom or propriety of the legislation is 
not for us to consider . . . "there is, without doubt, 
plenty of room, within the pale of the constitution, 
for ill-advised legislation. . . . That is a matter 
between the people and the representatives." . . . 
Within the limits of the constitution it is the 
prerogative of the legislature to control such 
matters, and the fact that an act may be ill-advised 
or unfortunate, if such it be, does not give rise to 
an appeal from the legislature to the courts for cor-
rection. . . . Under our system of government it is 
important that each branch thereof avoid infringement 
upon the prerogatives of the other. 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin., 122 
Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952) [citations omitted]; see also 
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). By 
its own mandate this Court does not interfere with the legisla-
ture's exercise of its prerogative unless a constitutional 
infringement is clearly established. Zamora v. Draper, 635 
P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981). 
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A. The Appropriate Standard of Review Is the Rational 
Basis Standard. 
In this appeal plaintiff challenges the constitutionality 
of § 78-14-4 as applied to minors on two grounds: (1) the pro-
vision violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
relating to a litigant's right of access to the courts, and 
(2) the provision violates state and federal guarantees of 
equal protection of laws. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-15.) 
The rational basis standard of review is the appropriate 
standard for deciding both of plaintiff's constitutional 
challenges. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 14 (Utah 
1984) (equal protection rational basis analysis applies to 
review of rights guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 11 of the Utah 
Constitution).2 
The majority of jurisdictions treat challenges under their 
state "Open Courts Provision" in the same fashion as the 
Utah forum. See Kite v. Campbell, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367 
(Cal. App. 1983); Licano v. Krausnick, 663 P.2d 1066, 1068 
(Colo. App. 1983); Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, Drykes, 
Goodenberger, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984); Chesewold 
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lamertson Const. Co., 462 A.2d 415, 
422 (Del. 1983); Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condominiums 
Ass'n. Inc., 312 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1984); Klier v. Catalano, 
437 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Mass. 1982); Schultz v. Funk, 410 
N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio 1979). Many courts have held that the 
legislature may abolish a common law cause of action 
regardless of the presence of an "Open Court" constitu-
tional provision. See Hartford Fire Ins., supra. In any 
event, the provision does not prohibit imposing reasonable 
limits upon the time within which one must seek redress in 
the court. See Phelan v. Hanft, 471 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1985); Rosnick v. Marks, 357 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Neb. 
1981); Neotzel v. Glascow, Inc., 487 A.2d 1372, 1378 (Pa. 
1985); Walsh v. Gerving, 494 A.2d 543, 547 (R.I. 1985). 
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The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution embody the same fundamental principle: 
"Persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if 
their circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 
669. Moreover, state courts seeking to base decisions on pro-
visions of their own state constitutions are obliged to conduct 
an analysis of their constitutions in the same fashion as a 
constitutional inquiry under the federal constitution. See 
Nettikisimmons, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 46 Mont. L„ Rev. 261 (1985). 
A statute may, however, treat groups differently and still 
meet constitutional equal protection and access to the courts 
requirements under constitutional analysis if: (1) the law 
applies equally to all persons within a class; and (2) the 
statutory classifications and different treatment given the 
classes have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of 
the statute. Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 670. 
The rational basis standard of review stated above has been 
used by this Court in all its prior reviews of the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations. See e.g., Allen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) 
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(cited in Malan v. Lewis, supra at 670). It is also the stan-
dard of review used by nearly all other state appellate courts 
which have reviewed the constitutionality of their own respec-
tive medical malpractice statutes. See American Bank and Trust 
Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (Cal. 1984) 
(citing 23 states and 3 federal circuits which have applied the 
rational basis standard of review to uphold the constitutional-
ity of classifications, such as that at issue in the instant 
case). 
The "strict scrutiny" and "heightened scrutiny" standards 
of review plaintiff urges the Court to adopt in this appeal are 
not applied to legislation which does not create a "suspect 
class" or affect a "fundamental constitutional right." Malan 
v. Lewis, supra at 674 n. 17.3 The United States District 
Court for the District of Utah has already rejected the argu-
ment for applying a "heightened scrutiny" review to a minor's 
constitutional challenge to the Utah medical malpractice 
statute of limitations: 
Unlike alienage, illegitimacy or gender, the class of 
minors with medical malpractice claims does not 
involve a fundamental interest or a classification of 
a suspect character. . . . 
The correct standard for equal protection 
analysis to be applied in this case under both the 
The "heightened scrutiny" analysis of such cases as Carson 
v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), relied on by plain-
tiff, has already come under attack by other appellate 
courts. See e.g., Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 33 (8th 
Cir. 1983) ("We are unpersuaded by the reasoning of Carson 
and decline to follow it.") 
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United States and Utah Constitutions is the rational 
basis test, 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984) (citing 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Brubaker v. 
Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); American Bank and 
Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 
(1984); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 
31 (Utah 1981) . 
B. Section 78-14-4 applies equally to the relevant class 
and reasonably furthers legislative objectives. 
The Statute of Limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4, must be held to be a con-
stitutional exercise of the Utah legislature's prerogative 
unless plaintiff can clearly establish that the statute does 
not meet the requirements of the rational basis standard of 
review. To satisfy the rational basis test, the statute must 
first, apply equally to all members of the created class. 
Malan v. Lewis, supra. The class created and protected by the 
Act is health care providers. See Allen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 634 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) ("The test . . . 
is whether there exists a rational basis to treat health care 
providers differently from other alleged tort feasors 
. . . .") Section 78-14-4 applies equally to all health care 
providers and therefore complies with the first prong of the 
rational basis test. The statute also treats equally the 
affected group, those persons including minors who have 
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personal injury claims against health care providers. See 
Argument § 1(A) and (B), supra. The classification of minors 
who are tort victims of health care providers and minors who 
are victims of other tort-feasors is rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest of controlling malpractice insurance 
costs and ensuring continued health care services in this 
state. See generally Redish, Legislative Response to the 
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional 
Implication, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977). 
Second, to satisfy equal protection review, the different 
treatment afforded the protected class must have a "reasonable 
tendency" to further the legislative objective. Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). 
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 
(Utah 1981), this Court reviewed the legislative objective 
behind the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and held that the 
Act and its statute of limitations are constitutional: 
It is therefore seen that the Act was premised 
upon the need to protect and insure the continued 
availability of health care services to the public, 
and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to shield insurance 
companies from legitimate claims. The legislature 
exercised its discretionary prerogative in determining 
that the shortening of the statute of limitations 
(along with requiring notice of intention to sue), 
would insure the continued availability of adequate 
health care services. 
635 P.2d at 32..; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977). 
Judicial review of legislation does not include a re-
evaluation of the facts the legislature could have considered 
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to determine the necessity for the enactment. The constitu-
tionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does 
not depend on a court's hindsight assessment of the empirical 
success or failure of the measure's provisions. As Justice 
Brennan explained in Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 
U.S. 456, 466 (1981): "whether in fact the Act will promote 
the [legislative objectives] is not the question: the Equal 
Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the 
[state] Legislature could rationally have decided" that the 
means chosen will promote the legislative objectives. 
(Emphasis added.) Where there was evidence before the 
Legislature which, if believed to be true, supported the crea-
tion of the statutory classification, a plaintiff cannot 
invalidate the statute by tendering evidence to support an 
argument that the Legislature may have been mistaken. Clover-
leaf, 449 U.S. at 466. 
The reports produced and relied on by defendant, cited 
herein, provide ample support for the Legislature's belief that 
tort reform in the medical malpractice area was and is needed 
to insure the continued availability of quality health care, 
and that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
claims would further that objective. In Allen this Court so 
concluded. 635 P.2d at 31-32. 
The Federal District Court for Utah stated that the burden 
of weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and 
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the medical malpractice crisis in general and thereby to ensure 
the availability of health care services against the competing 
interests of minors and mental incompetents whose parents or 
guardians fail to timely initiate an action is a problem to be 
handled by the legislature, not the courts. Hargett, 598 
F. Supp. at 158. The reasons for leaving the balancing process 
to the legislature are important: 
[A]ny possible harm that may be suffered by a minor 
whose parents or guardians fail to initiate the action 
against a potential tortious wrongdoer within the 
appropriate time period may be outweighed by the 
chaos, uncertainty, and severe prejudice which will 
occur to those accused of tortious conduct, their 
insurance carriers, and ultimately to the insurance 
carriers rate payers when lawsuits are permitted to be 
initiated decades after the occurrence of the incident 
giving rise thereto. Before such a sweeping change is 
made the question of "reserve requirements" imposed on 
insurance carriers and the resulting effect on insur-
ance rates as well as many other issues must be 
addressed. The Legislature, not the courts, is the 
proper forum for the resolution of such issues. 
(Emphasis added.) 
De Santis v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (Pa. Super. 1981). 
Indeed, in almost all areas, the law expects the parents or 
guardians will look after and protect the child's interest. 
Absent the presence of a fundamental right, parents are 
expected and allowed to exercise broad decision-making 
authority over their children. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 
(1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979). 
Based upon sound and well-reasoned authorities, appropriate 
principles of judicial review, and legislative objectives 
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underlying the Act and its statute of limitations, it is evi-
dent that § 78-14-4 complies with federal and state guarantees 
of equal protection of laws and does not deny this plaintiff 
access to the courts. Other jurisdictions which have analyzed 
equal protection and due process attacks by minor plaintiffs 
against medical malpractice statutes of limitations have 
reached similar results.4 
See e.g., Donabedian v Manzer, 200 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal. 
App. 1 Dist. 1984); Kite v. Campbell, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 
(App. 1983) (statute providing that medical malpractice 
actions by a minor must be commenced within three years 
from the date of the alleged wrongful act did not deny a 
minor's right to due process under law; as a matter of con-
stitutional law, a statute of limitation is remedial in 
nature and does not destroy fundamental rights); Wheeler v. 
Lenski, 658 P.2d 1056 (Kan. App. 1983) (statute which 
shortens period of limitation for minors and incapacitated 
persons in medical malpractice actions did not violate 
equal protection or due process); Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d 
342 (Pa. Super. 1982) (the settled rule is that it is not 
violative of any constitutional rights to hold minors bound 
equally with adults to the prescribed statutory periods 
within which legal causes of action may be brought); Reese 
v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, 403 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1981) 
(statute of limitations did not violate due process and 
equal protection provisions of state or federal constitu-
tions on ground that statute created minors injured through 
medical malpractice differently from minor victims of other 
torts); Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So.2d 90 (Ala. 1981) 
(minor's medical malpractice action was barred by the 
statute of limitations and was properly dismissed); Johnson 
v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) 
(time limitation effecting medical malpractice claim for 
death of a minor child was not contrary to due process and 
equal protection); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891 
(Ind. 1980) (court held that the legislature was not con-
stitutionally mandated to suspend application of statutes 
of limitation in cases of infancy or incapacity and dis-
missed appeal which challenged constitutionality of statute 
of limitations of medical malpractice act). 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court applied sound and time-honored prece-
dents of this Court to conclude that equal treatment of minors 
and adults under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was a 
constitutionally valid exercise of legislative prerogative. 
The rational basis standard of review this Court and nearly all 
other state appellate courts have applied to review the consti-
tutionality of medical malpractice statutes clearly supports 
that conclusion. 
The increase in the number and size of medical malpractice 
claims brought against health care providers, particularly 
those practicing in specialized areas of medicine, during the 
last ten years demonstrates unequivocally that the 
Legislature's concern about the future cost and availability of 
professional liability insurance was indeed well founded. 
Since 1976, insurance rates in Utah and throughout the country 
have skyrocketed. In December, 1984, Aetna Life and Casualty, 
for years Utah's most prominent professional liability insur-
ance carrier, withdrew from the Utah market. The Legislature 
addressed the issue again in 1985 and 1986 because every indi-
cation is that the situation will worsen, not improve, in the 
future. 
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The action of the Utah Legislature in enacting the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act and its statute of limitations is 
an appropriate response to a legitimate and real concern. It 
is, after all, the public which ultimately pays the cost of 
professional liability insurance and benefits from the con-
tinued availability of such coverage when injuries are suf-
fered. In the furtherance of that objective, the Legislature 
reasonably required all persons, including minors, to present 
claims timely, which is essential to give insurers a reasonable 
opportunity to reduce losses in an extremely volatile insurance 
market. The Legislature also perceived that in medicine where 
advances in procedures, knowledge and technology occur so 
rapidly, a long delay in the prosecution of an action seriously 
and detrimentally affects a health care provider's ability to 
defend care that may have been standard when rendered, but 
which may seem ineffectual or even harmful in retrospect. 
Respondents respectfully urge the Court to affirm the deci-
sion of the court below thereby reaffirming its long-standing 
position that "under our system of government, it is important 
that each branch thereof avoid infringement on the prerogatives 
of the other." Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. 
of Admin., 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952). 
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DATED this 0- day of , 1986 
NOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Elliot/ty. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SCM1714U 
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DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, _f, Ci r/f 4; /n 
STATE OF UTAH ^ — - 3 ^ " °",cUPft 
Civil No. 68963 
RULING 
SUZANNE LEE, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR. LYNN GAUFIN, 
Defendant. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 
2.8, on the motion of Defendant seeking judgment on the 
pleadings. The Court has reviewed the file, reconsidered 
the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, 
and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the follow-
ing: 
RULING 
1. The ruling of this Court granting said motion 
on October 9, 1985 is hereby confirmed and reinstated. 
The Court is of the opinion that the case of Scott 
vs. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P2d 746, is 
not controlling. Sections 78-14-4(1) & (2) UCA were enacted 
subsequent to the decision in the Scott case and such sections 
clearly demonstrate the legislative intent to withdraw the 
protection of causes of action of minors which may have pre-
viously been afforded by reason of Section 78-12-36(1) UCA. 
The stated legislative purpose to protect and insure the 
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continued availability of health care services to the public 
by including causes of actions of minors within those causes 
affected by the shorter period of limitations does not appear 
to the Court to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to consti-
tutionally invalidate Sections 78-14-4(1) & (2) UCA 1953 as 
amended. 
2. The proposed order in conformity with the above 
ruling heretofore submitted and served on October 16, 1985, 
has been executed by the Court this date and accordingly filed 
with the Clerk of the Court. 
Dated this c£7 ~ day
 0f /^yCyy^C^^ 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Cullen ]y. Christensen, Judge 
A-2 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
'MS my 2? pu !'"'*' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE LEE and NATHAN LEE 
GARZA, through his guardian, 
SUZANNE LEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
DR. LYNN GAUFIN, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 68963 
The Motion of defendant, Dr. Lynn Gaufin, for Judgment on 
the Pleadings came on regularly for disposition pursuant to 
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts, the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, presiding, and the Court having 
reviewed the Memoranda and pleadings on file herein and being 
fully advised in the premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion of defendant, 
Dr. Lynn Gaufin, for Judgment on the Pleadings be and the same 
is hereby granted and judgment in favor of the defendant and 
against plaintiffs be and the same is hereby entered for the 
reason that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended). 
DATED this >//— day of Oetefensr, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
CULLEN/^T CHRISTENSEN 
District Judge 
A-4 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
CORINNE M. GLASS , being duly sworn, 
says that he/she is employed in the law offices of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendant 
herein; that he/she served the attached Judgment on the 
Pleadings 
(Case No. 68963 , Utah County) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs; 
G. Steven Sullivan 
Robert J. Debry 
Robert J. Debry & Associates 
965 East 4800 South, Suite No. 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
and causino^the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the \\p-wv day of October , 198 5 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this \ \ffi^ day^  of 
October , 198 5 . 
[iU K^^Ocrn, 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY\PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to: 
David M. Jorgensen 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. Debry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
on the 2nd day of June, 1986. 
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